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he unimpeded growth of greenhouse gas emissions 
is raising the earth’s temperature. The consequences 
include melting glaciers, more precipitation, more and 
more extreme weather events, and shifting seasons. 
The accelerating pace of climate change, combined with 
global population and income growth, threatens food 
security everywhere. 
Agriculture is extremely vulnerable to climate 
change. Higher temperatures eventually reduce yields  
of desirable crops while encouraging weed and pest  
proliferation. Changes in precipitation patterns in-
crease the likelihood of short-run crop failures and 
long-run production declines.  Although there will be 
gains in some crops in some regions of the world, the 
overall impacts of climate change on agriculture are 
expected to be negative, threatening global food security. 
Populations in the developing world, which are  
already vulnerable and food insecure, are likely to  
be the most seriously affected. In 2005, nearly half  
of the economically active population in developing 
countries—2.5 billion people—relied on agriculture 
for its livelihood. Today, 75 percent of the world’s poor 
live in rural areas.1 
This Food Policy Report presents research results 
that quantify the climate-change impacts mentioned 
above, assesses the consequences for food security, 
and estimates the investments that would offset the 
negative consequences for human well-being. 
This analysis brings together, for the first time,  
detailed modeling of crop growth under climate  
change with insights from an extremely detailed global 
agriculture model, using two climate scenarios to  
simulate future climate. The results of the analysis  
suggest that agriculture and human well-being will 
be negatively affected by climate change: 
• In developing countries, climate change will cause 
yield declines for the most important crops. South 
Asia will be particularly hard hit.
• Climate change will have varying effects on irrigated 
yields across regions, but irrigated yields for all crops 
in South Asia will experience large declines.
• Climate change will result in additional price increases 
for the most important agricultural crops–rice, wheat, 
maize, and soybeans. Higher feed prices will result in 
higher meat prices.  As a result, climate change will 
reduce the growth in meat consumption slightly and 
cause a more substantial fall in cereals consumption. 
• Calorie availability in 2050 will not only be lower  
than in the no–climate-change scenario—it will  
actually decline relative to 2000 levels throughout  
the developing world.
• By 2050, the decline in calorie availability will increase 
child malnutrition by 20 percent relative to a world 
with no climate change. Climate change will eliminate 
much of the improvement in child malnourishment 
levels that would occur with no climate change.
• Thus, aggressive agricultural productivity investments 
of US$7.1–7.3 billion2 are needed to raise calorie 
consumption enough to offset the negative 
impacts of climate change on the health and 

















The results of this analysis suggest the following policy 
and program recommendations. 
1.  Design and implement good overall  
development policies and programs. 
Given the current uncertainty about location-specific 
effects of climate change, good development policies 
and programs are also the best climate-change  
adaptation investments.  A pro-growth, pro-poor  
development agenda that supports agricultural  
sustainability also contributes to food security  
and climate-change adaptation in the developing  
world.  Adaptation to climate change is easier when  
individuals have more resources and operate in an  
economic environment that is flexible and responsive.  
2.  Increase investments in agricultural productivity. 
Even without climate change, greater investments in 
agricultural science and technology are needed to 
meet the demands of a world population expected 
to reach 9 billion by 2050. Many of these people will 
live in the developing world, have higher incomes, and 
desire a more diverse diet.  Agricultural science- and 
technology-based solutions are essential to meet 
those demands.  
      Climate change places new and more challenging 
demands on agricultural productivity. Crop and livestock 
productivity-enhancing research, including biotechnol-
ogy, will be essential to help overcome stresses due to 
climate change. Crops and livestock are needed that are 
doing reasonably well in a range of production environ-
ments rather than extremely well in a narrow set of 
climate conditions. Research on dietary changes  
in food animals and changes in irrigation-management 
practices is needed to reduce methane emissions.  
     One of the key lessons of the Green Revolution  
is that improved agricultural productivity, even if not  
targeted to the poorest of the poor, can be a powerful 
mechanism for alleviating poverty indirectly by  
creating jobs and lowering food prices. Productivity 
enhancements that increase farmers’ resilience in the 
face of climate-change pressures will likely have similar 
poverty-reducing effects. 
      Rural infrastructure is essential if farmers are  
to take advantage of improved crop varieties and  
management techniques. Higher yields and more 
cropped area require maintaining and increasing the 
density of rural road networks to increase access to 
markets and reduce transaction costs. Investments in 
irrigation infrastructure are also needed, especially to 
improve the efficiency of water use, but care must be 
taken to avoid investments in places where water  
availability is likely to decline. 
3.  Reinvigorate national research and extension 
programs.  Investment in laboratory scientists and 
the infrastructure they require is needed.  
Partnerships with other national systems and  
international centers are part of the solution.  
Collaboration with local farmers, input suppliers,  
traders, and consumer groups is also essential for  
effective development and dissemination of locally  
appropriate, cost-effective techniques and cultivars  
to help revitalize communications among farmers,  
scientists, and other stakeholders to meet the  
challenges of climate change. 
      Within countries, extension programs can play  
a key role in information sharing by transferring  
technology, facilitating interaction, building capacity 
among farmers, and encouraging farmers to form  
their own networks. Extension services that  
specifically address climate-change adaptation include 
disseminating local cultivars of drought-resistant  
crop varieties, teaching improved management  















national research work. Farmer organizations can  
be an effective information-sharing mechanism and 
have the potential to provide cost-effective links  
between government efforts and farmer activities.  
4.  Improve global data collection, dissemination, 
and analysis. Climate change will have dramatic 
consequences for agriculture. However, substantial 
uncertainty remains about where the effects will be 
greatest. These uncertainties make it challenging to 
move forward on policies to combat the effects  
of climate change. Global efforts to collect and  
disseminate data on the spatial nature of agriculture 
need to be strengthened. Regular, repeated  
observations of the surface of the earth via remote 
sensing are critical. Funding for national statistical 
programs should be increased so that they can  
fulfill the task of monitoring global change.  
Understanding agriculture–climate interactions  
well enough to support adaptation and mitigation 
activities based on land use requires major  
improvements in data collection, dissemination,  
and analysis. 
5.  Make agricultural adaptation a key agenda  
point within the international climate  
negotiation process. International climate 
negotiations provide a window of opportunity  
for governments and civil-society organizations to  
advance proposals for practical actions on adaptation  
in agriculture.  
6.  Recognize that enhanced food security and 
climate-change adaptation go hand in hand. 
Climate change will pose huge challenges to food- 
security efforts. Hence, any activity that supports  
agricultural adaptation also enhances food security.  
Conversely, anything that results in increased food  
security will provide the poor, especially the rural  
poor, with the resources that will help them adapt  
to climate change. 
7.  Support community-based adaptation  
strategies. Crop and livestock productivity, market 
access, and the effects of climate all are extremely 
location specific. International development agencies 
and national governments should work to ensure 
that technical, financial, and capacity-building support 
reaches local communities. They should also encour-
age community participation in national adaptation 
planning processes. Community-based adaptation 
strategies can help rural communities strengthen 
their capacity to cope with disasters, improve their 
land-management skills, and diversify their livelihoods. 
While national adaptation policies and strategies are 
important, the implementation of these strategies at 
the local level will be the ultimate test of the effec-
tiveness of adaptation. 
8.  Increase funding for adaptation programs  
by at least an additional $7 billion per year. 
At least $7 billion per year in additional  
funding is required to finance the research, rural 
infrastructure, and irrigation investments needed  
to offset the negative effects of climate change  
on human well-being. The mix of investments  
differs by region: Sub-Saharan Africa requires the 
greatest overall investment and a greater share of 
investments in roads, Latin America in agricultural 






























he research underlying this report provides detailed estimates of the impacts of climate change on agricultural 
production, consumption, prices, and trade, and also estimates the costs of adaptation. It uses a global 
agricultural supply-and-demand projection model (IMPACT 2009) linked to a biophysical crop model (DSSAT) 
of the impact of climate change on five important crops: rice, wheat, maize, soybeans, and groundnuts (see box). 
The report assesses climate-change effects on food security and human well-being using two indicators: per capita 
calorie consumption and child malnutrition numbers. It estimates the cost of investments—in three primary sources 
of increased agricultural productivity (agricultural research, rural roads, and irrigation)—needed to return the values 
of these two indicators from their 2050 values with climate change to their 2050 values without climate change. In 
other words, this report isolates the effects of climate change on future well-being and identifies only the costs of 
compensating for climate change.  
Climate-Change Scenarios
3
  IMPACT 2009
The IMPACT model was originally developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) for 
projecting global food supply, food demand, and food security to 2020 and beyond.4 It analyzes 32 crop and 
livestock commodities in 281 regions of the world that together cover the earth’s land surface (with the  
exception of Antarctica). These regions are called food production units (FPUs). Production and demand 
relationships in countries are linked through international trade flows. The model simulates growth in crop 
production, determined by crop and input prices, externally determined rates of productivity growth and area 
expansion, investment in irrigation, and water availability. Demand is a function of prices, income, and popula-
tion growth and contains four categories of commodity demand—food, feed, biofuels, and other uses. The 2009 
version of the model includes a hydrology model and links to the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology 
Transfer (DSSAT) crop-simulation model, with yield effects of climate change at 0.5-degree intervals aggregated 
up to the food-production-unit level. 
The DSSAT model is used to assess climate-change effects and CO2 fertilization for five crops–rice, wheat, 
maize, soybeans, and groundnuts. For the remaining crops in IMPACT, the primary assumption is that plants 
with similar photosynthetic metabolic pathways will react similarly to any given climate-change effect in  
a particular geographic region. Millet, sorghum, sugarcane, and maize all follow the same (C4) metabolic  
pathway and are assumed to follow the DSSAT results for maize, in the respective geographic regions. The 
other crops in IMPACT follow a different pathway (C3), so the climate effects are assumed to follow the  
average for wheat, rice, soy, and groundnuts from the same geographic region, with two exceptions. The  
IMPACT commodities of “other grains” and dryland legumes are directly mapped to the DSSAT results for 





























Figure 1—Change in average maximum temperature ( oC), 2000–2050
Because climate-change simulations are inherently 
uncertain, two climate models have been used to 
simulate future climate, using the A25 scenario of 
the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report: the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research, US (NCAR) model 
and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organization, Australia (CSIRO) model. We 
refer to the combination of model runs with A2 inputs 
as the NCAR and CSIRO scenarios. Both scenarios 
project higher temperatures in 2050, resulting in higher 
evaporation and increased precipitation as this water 
vapor returns to earth. The “wetter” NCAR scenario 
estimates average precipitation increases on land of 
about 10 percent, whereas the “drier” CSIRO scenario 
estimates increases of about 2 percent. Figure 1 shows 
the change in average maximum temperature between 
2000 and 2050 for the CSIRO and NCAR scenarios. 
Figure 2 shows changes in average precipitation. In each 
set of figures, the legend colors are identical; a specific 
color represents the same change in temperature or 


































A quick glance at these figures shows that substantial 
differences exist across the two scenarios. For 
example, the NCAR scenario has substantially higher 
average maximum temperatures than does CSIRO. 
The CSIRO scenario has substantial precipitation 
declines in the western Amazon while NCAR shows 
declines in the eastern Amazon. The NCAR scenario 
has higher precipitation in Sub-Saharan Africa than does 
CSIRO. Northern China has both higher temperature 
and more precipitation under NCAR than under 
CSIRO. These figures qualitatively illustrate the range 
of potential climate outcomes using current modeling 
capabilities and provide an indication of the uncertainty 
in climate-change impacts.



































he impacts of climate change on agriculture and human well-being include: 1) the biological effects on 
crop yields; 2) the resulting impacts on outcomes including prices, production, and consumption; and 3) 
the impacts on per capita calorie consumption and child malnutrition. The biophysical effects of climate change 
on agriculture induce changes in production and prices, which play out through the economic system as farmers 
and other market participants adjust autonomously, altering crop mix, input use, production, food demand, food 
consumption, and trade. 
Impacts of Climate Change
1.  The Biological Effects of  
Climate Change on Yields 
Rising temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns 
have direct effects on crop yields, as well as indirect 
effects through changes in irrigation water availability. 
Direct effects on yields: rainfed and irrigated crops
Table 1 reports the direct biological effects of the 
two climate-change scenarios on crop yields modeled 
directly with DSSAT for rainfed and irrigated crops in 
developing and developed countries,6 with and without 
CO2 fertilization (CF and No CF).7 These results are 
created by “growing” each crop around the world at 
0.5-degree intervals with 2000 climate, growing them 
again with a 2050 scenario value, and then calculating 
the ratio. In other words, no economic adjustments are 
included. The rainfed yield changes are driven by both 
precipitation and temperature changes; the irrigated 
yield effects are from temperature changes alone.
In developing countries, yield declines predominate 
for most crops without CO2 fertilization. Irrigated 
wheat and irrigated rice are especially hard hit. On 
average, yields in developed countries are affected less 
than those in developing countries. For a few crops, 
climate change actually increases developed-country 
yields. In calculating these projections, the East Asia and 
Pacific region combines China, which is temperate for 
the most part, and Southeast Asia, which is tropical. 
The differential effects of climate change in these two 
climate zones are concealed. In China, some crops fare 
reasonably well because higher future temperatures 
are favorable in locations where current temperatures 
are at the low end of the crop’s optimal temperature. 
Yields of important crops in Southeast Asia fall 
substantially in both scenarios unless CO2 fertilization 
is effective in farmers’ fields.
South Asia is particularly hard hit by climate 
change. For almost all crops, it is the region with the 
greatest yield decline.  With CO2 fertilization, the 
yield declines are lower; in many locations, some 
yield increases occur relative to 2000. However, 
rainfed maize and irrigated and rainfed wheat still see 
substantial areas of reduced yields. Sub-Saharan Africa 
sees mixed results, with small declines or increases 
in maize yields and large negative effects on rainfed 
wheat. The Latin America and Caribbean region also 
has mixed yield effects, with some crops up slightly 
and some down. 
Indirect effects: Irrigated crops
Climate change will have a direct impact on water 
availability for irrigated crops. Internal renewable water 
(IRW) is the water available from precipitation. Both 
climate scenarios result in more precipitation over land 
than would occur with no climate change. Under the 
NCAR scenario, all regions experience increased IRW. 
Under the CSIRO scenario, the average IRW increase 
is less than occurs with NCAR, and the Middle East 
and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa regions both 
experience reductions of about 4 percent. 
In addition to precipitation changes, climate 
change-induced higher temperatures increase the 
water requirements of crops. The ratio of water 
consumption to requirements is called irrigation 
water supply reliability (IWSR). The smaller the ratio, 















Table 1—Climate-change induced yield effects by crop and management system, % change from 
yield with 2000 climate to yield with 2050 climate
Region CSIRO No CF NCAR No CF CSIRO CF NCAR CF
Maize, irrigated
   Developing countries –2.0 –2.8 –1.4 –2.1
   Developed countries –1.2 –8.7 –1.2 –8.6
Maize, rainfed
   Developing countries 0.2 –2.9 2.6 –0.8
   Developed countries 0.6 –5.7 9.5 2.5
Rice, irrigated
   Developing countries –14.4 –18.5 2.4 –0.5
   Developed countries –3.5 –5.5 10.5 9.0
Rice, rainfed
   Developing countries –1.3 –1.4 6.5 6.4
   Developed countries 17.3 10.3 23.4 17.8
Wheat, irrigated
   Developing countries –28.3 –34.3 –20.8 –27.2
   Developed countries –5.7 –4.9 –1.3 –0.1
Wheat, rainfed
   Developing countries –1.4 –1.1 9.3 8.5
   Developed countries 3.1 2.4 9.7 9.5
Across the group of developing countries, IWSR 
improves under the NCAR scenario and worsens 
under the CSIRO scenario. However, regional 
differentiation of climate-change effects is important. 
IWSR improves slightly for the Latin America and 
Caribbean region and for the Middle East and North 
Africa, but worsens slightly for Sub-Saharan Africa 
under both scenarios. For East Asia and the Pacific and 
for South Asia, reliability increases under the NCAR 
scenario but declines under the CSIRO scenario.
Yield reductions of irrigated crops due to water 
stress are directly estimated in the hydrology portion 
of IMPACT, taking into account the growing demand 
for water outside agriculture as well as agricultural 
demands. As expected, irrigated yield losses due to 
water stress are relatively higher under the CSIRO 
scenario than the NCAR scenario. For example, in 
East Asia and the Pacific, with no climate change, the 
combined effects of nonagricultural demand growth 
and increased irrigated area result in an average 
4.8-percent decline in irrigated rice yields. Under 
the NCAR scenario, that decline is only 1.2 percent. 
However, under the drier CSIRO scenario, the 
irrigated yield loss from water stress is 6.7 percent. 
In East Asia and the Pacific, irrigated rice, wheat, and 
maize yield losses are all large under the CSIRO 
model. South Asia irrigated yields for all crops would 
experience large declines under both scenarios. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, maize yields are less under both 
models, but the CSIRO effects are especially large. 
Latin America and the Caribbean yields are relatively 
unaffected, in part due to the small amount of 
irrigated production in that region.
Source: Compiled by authors.
Note: For each crop and management system, this table reports the area weighted average change in yield for a crop grown with 2050 climate instead 















2.  Prices, Production, and Food  
Consumption 
Prices
World prices are a useful single indicator of the effects 
of climate change on agriculture. Table 2 reports the 
effects of the two climate-change scenarios on world 
food prices, with and without CO2 fertilization. It also 
reports the effects with no climate change. Figures 3 
and 4 demonstrate world price effects for livestock 
production and major grains, respectively, assuming no 
CO2 fertilization.
With no climate change, world prices for the 
most important agricultural crops—rice, wheat, maize, 
and soybeans will increase between 2000 and 2050, 
driven by population and income growth and biofuels 
demand. Even with no climate change, the price of 
rice would rise by 62 percent, maize by 63 percent, 
soybeans by 72 percent, and wheat by 39 percent. 
Climate change results in additional price increases— 
a total of 32 to 37 percent for rice, 52 to 55 percent 
for maize, 94 to 111 percent for wheat, and 11 to  
14 percent for soybeans. If CO2 fertilization is 
effective in farmers’ fields, these 2050 prices are  
10 percent smaller.
Livestock are not directly affected by climate 
change in the IMPACT model, but the effects of higher 
feed prices caused by climate change pass through to 
livestock, resulting in higher meat prices. For example, 
beef prices are 33 percent higher by 2050 with no 
climate change and 60 percent higher with climate 
change and no CO2 fertilization of crops. With CO2 
fertilization, crop-price increases are less, so the beef-
price increase is about 1.5 percent less than with no 
CO2 fertilization. 
Production
Table 3 reports the effects of climate change on 
crop production in 2050 compared to production 
without climate change, based on the NCAR and 
CSIRO scenarios, accounting for both the direct 
changes in yield and area caused by climate change and 
autonomous adaptation as farmers respond to changing 
prices with changes in crop mix and input use. The 
negative effects of climate change on crop production 
are especially pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia. In South Asia, the climate scenario results 
in a 14-percent decline in rice production relative to 
the no–climate-change scenario, a 44- to 49-percent 
decline in wheat production, and a 9- to 19-percent 
fall in maize production. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
rice, wheat, and maize yield declines with climate 
change are 15 percent, 34 percent, and 10 percent, 
respectively. For East Asia and the Pacific, the results 
are mixed and depend on both the crop and the 
model used. Rice production declines by around 10 
percent, wheat production increases slightly, and maize 
production declines with the drier CSIRO scenario 
but increases with the NCAR scenario. Comparing 
average production changes, developing countries fare 
worse for all crops under both the CSIRO and NCAR 
scenarios than do developed countries.
Food Consumption
Agricultural output used for human consumption is 
determined by the interaction of supply, demand, and 
the resulting prices with individual preferences and 
income. Table 4 shows average per capita consumption 
of cereals and meat products in 2000 and in 2050 
under the CSIRO and NCAR models, with and 
without CO2 fertilization. It also reports consumption 
with no climate change. 
Without climate change, rising per capita income 
results in reduced declines in per capita consumption 
of cereals in developing countries between 2000 and 
2050 and increased meat consumption increases, with 
the meat increases more than offsetting the decline in 
cereals. Climate change reduces the growth in meat 
consumption slightly and causes a more substantial fall 
in the consumption of cereals. These results are the 
first indication of the negative welfare effects due to 
climate change. Both models have similar effects. 
3.  Per Capita Calorie Consumption  
and Child Malnutrition
The primary measures used for the effects of 
climate change on human welfare are the change 
in calorie availability and the change in the number 
of malnourished children between 2000 and 2050 
without climate change, and in 2050 using the two 
climate-change scenarios. 
The declining consumption of cereals translates  
into similarly large declines in calorie availability as  
the result of climate change (see Figure 5 and Tables 5 and 




























 effect  
(% change  
from no CF)
Rice (US$/mt) 190 307 421 406 –17.0 –15.1
% change from 2000 61.6 121.2 113.4
% change from 2050, 
no climate change 36.8 32.0
Wheat (US$/mt) 113 158 334 307 –11.4 –12.5
% change from 2000 39.3 194.4 170.6
% change from 2050, 
no climate change 111.3 94.2
Maize (US$/mt) 95 155 235 240 –11.2 –12.6
% change from 2000 63.3 148.0 153.3
% change from 2050, 
no climate change 51.9 55.1
Soybeans (US$/mt) 206 354 394 404 –60.6 –62.2
% change from 2000 72.1 91.6 96.4
% change from 2050, 
no climate change 11.4 14.2
Beef (US$/mt) 1,925 2,556 3,078 3,073 –1.3 –1.5
% change from 2000 32.8 59.8 59.6
% change from 2050, 
no climate change 20.4 20.2
Pork (US$/mt) 911 1,240 1,457 1,458 –1.3 –1.5
% change from 2000 36.1 60.0 60.1
% change from 2050, 
no climate change 17.5 17.6
Lamb (US$/mt) 2,713 3,102 3,462 3,461 –0.7 –0.8
% change from 2000 14.4 27.6 27.6
% change from 2050, 
no climate change 11.6 11.6
Poultry (US$/mt) 1,203 1,621 1,968 1,969 –1.9 –2.1
% change from 2000 34.7 63.6 63.6
% change from 2050, 
no climate change 21.4 21.5
Source: Compiled by authors. 















Source: Compiled by authors.
























Beef Pork Lamb Poultry Eggs
2000 2050 No Climate Change
2050 CSIRO NoCF 2050 NCAR NoCF
Figure 3—World prices, Livestock products
Source: Compiled by authors.
Note: Prices are in 2000 US$.
Rice Wheat Maize Soybeans Other grains
2000 2050 No Climate Change

















































2000 (mmt) 119.8 221.7 1.1 14.8 5.5 7.4 20.4 370.3 390.7
2050 No CC (mmt) 168.9 217.0 2.6 17.8 10.3 18.3 20.3 434.9 455.2
2050 No CC (% change) 41.0 –2.1 144.4 19.8 87.4 146.0 –0.3 17.4 16.5
CSIRO (% change) –14.3 –8.1 –0.2 –21.7 –32.9 –14.5 –11.8 –11.9 –11.9
NCAR (% change) –14.5 –11.3 –0.8 –19.2 –39.7 –15.2 –10.6 –13.6 –13.5
Wheat
2000 (mmt) 96.7 102.1 127.5 23.5 23.6 4.5 205.2 377.9 583.1
2050 No CC (mmt) 191.3 104.3 252.6 42.1 62.0 11.4 253.7 663.6 917.4
2050 No CC (% change) 97.9 2.1 98.1 78.7 162.3 154.4 23.6 75.6 57.3
CSIRO (% change) –43.7 1.8  –43.4 11.4  –5.1 –33.5 –7.6 –29.2 –23.2
NCAR (% change) –48.8 1.8  –51.0 17.4  –8.7 –35.8 –11.2 –33.5 –27.4
Maize
2000 (mmt) 16.2 141.8 38.0 80.1 8.2 37.1 297.9 321.3 619.2
2050 No CC (mmt) 18.7 264.7 62.7 143.1 13.1 53.9 505.1 556.2 1.061.3
2050 No CC (% change) 15.7 86.6 65.1 78.8 59.4 45.3 69.6 73.1 71.4
CSIRO (% change) –18.5 –12.7 –19.0 –0.3 –6.8 –9.6 11.5  –10.0 0.2 
NCAR (% change) –8.9 8.9  –38.3 –4.0 –9.8 –7.1 1.8  –2.3 –0.4
Millet
2000 (mmt) 10.5 2.3 1.2 0.0 0.0 13.1 0.5 27.3 27.8
2050 No CC (mmt) 12.3 3.5 2.1 0.1 0.1 48.1 0.8 66.2 67.0
2050 No CC (% change) 16.5 50.1 77.2 113.0 128.0 267.2 60.5 142.5 141.0
CSIRO (% change) –19.0 4.2  –4.3 8.8  –5.5 –6.9 –3.0 –8.5 –8.4
NCAR (% change) –9.5 8.3  –5.2 7.2  –2.7 –7.6 –5.6 –7.0 –7.0
Sorghum
2000 (mmt) 8.4 3.1 0.1 11.4 1.0 19.0 16.9 43.0 59.9
2050 No CC (mmt) 9.6 3.4 0.4 28.0 1.1 60.1 20.9 102.6 123.5
2050 No CC (% change) 13.9 11.6 180.9 145.3 12.2 216.9 23.6 138.7 106.2
CSIRO (% change) –19.6 1.4  –2.7 2.3  0.3  –2.3 –3.1 –2.5 –2.6
NCAR (% change) –12.2 6.7  –10.4 4.3  0.7  –3.0 –7.3 –1.5 –2.5
Source: Compiled by authors.
Note: The rows labeled “2050 No CC (% change)” indicate the percent change between production in 2000 and 2050 with no climate change. The rows labeled “CSIRO (% 
change)” and “NCAR (% change)” indicate the additional percent change in production in 2050 due to climate change relative to 2050 with no climate change. For example, 
South Asia sorghum production was 8.4 mmt in 2000. With no climate change, South Asia sorghum production is predicted to increase to 9.6 mmt in 2050, an increase of 
13.9 percent. With the CSIRO scenario, South Asia sorghum production in 2050 is 19.6 percent lower than with no climate change in 2050 (7.72 mmt instead of 9.6 mmt); 
















throughout the world between 2000 and 2050. The 
largest increase, of 13.8 percent, is in East Asia and the 
Pacific, but there are gains for the average consumer in all 
countries—by 3.7 percent in Latin America, 5.9 percent in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and 9.7 percent in South Asia.
With climate change, however, calorie availability 
in 2050 is not only lower than the no-climate-change 
scenario in 2050—it actually declines relative to 
2000 levels throughout the world. For the average 
consumer in a developing country, the decline is 
10 percent relative to 2000. With CO2 fertilization, 
the declines are 3 percent to 7 percent less severe, 
but are still large relative to the no–climate-change 
scenario. There is almost no difference in calorie 
outcome between the two climate scenarios.
Table 4—Per capita consumption (kg per year) of cereals and meats with and without climate 










CF effect  
(% change  
relative to 




(% change  
relative to 
NCAR no CF  
in 2050)
Meat
South Asia 6 16 14 14 0.9 0.8
East Asia and the Pacific 40 71 66 66 0.7 0.6
Europe and Central Asia 42 56 51 51 0.8 0.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 57 71 64 64 1.0 0.9
Middle East and North Africa 23 39 36 36 0.7 0.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 11 18 16 16 1.0 0.8
Developed countries 88 100 92 92 0.8 0.7
Developing countries 28 41 37 37 0.8 0.7
Cereals
South Asia 164 157 124 121 7.0 7.1
East Asia and the Pacific 184 158 124 120 8.1 8.3
Europe and Central Asia 162 169 132 128 5.3 4.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 123 109 89 87 6.1 5.9
Middle East and North Africa 216 217 172 167 5.5 5.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 117 115 89 89 7.4 7.1
Developed countries 118 130 97 94 6.8 6.3
Developing countries 164 148 116 114 7.1 7.1


























































2000 No Climate Change NCAR CSIRO
Figure 5—Daily per capita calorie availability with and without climate change 
















(% change  
relative to 




(% change  
relative to 
CSIRO no CF  
in 2050)
South Asia 2,424 2,660 2,226 2,255 4.3 4.3
East Asia and the Pacific 2,879 3,277 2,789 2,814 4.3 4.3
Europe and Central Asia 3,017 3,382 2,852 2,885 2.7 2.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 2,879 2,985 2,615 2,628 2.7 2.8
Middle East and North Africa 2,846 3,119 2,561 2,596 3.6 3.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 2,316 2,452 1,924 1,931 6.5 6.9
Developed countries 3,450 3,645 3,190 3,215 2.3 2.5
Developing countries 2,696 2,886 2,410 2,432 4.4 4.4


























(% change  
relative to NCAR 




(% change  
relative to CSIRO 
no CF  
in 2050) Region
South Asia 76 52 59 59 –3 –3
East Asia and the Pacific 24 10 15 14 –9 –9
Europe and Central Asia 4 3 4 4 –4 –5














Middle East and North Africa 3 1 2 2 –10 –11
Sub-Saharan Africa 33 42 52 52 –5 –6
All developing countries 148 113 139 137 –5 –5
Source: Compiled by authors.
Note: The last two columns in this table report the percentage difference between the number of malnourished children in 2050 with and without 
CO2 fertilization. For example, under the NCAR model, assuming CO2 fertilization is effective in the field, there would be a 3-percent decline in the 

















limate-change adaptation is increasingly on the agenda of researchers, policymakers, and program 
developers who are aware that climate change is real and threatens to undermine social and ecological 
sustainability. In agriculture, adaptation efforts focus on implementing measures that help build rural livelihoods 
that are more resilient to climate variability and disaster. This section provides an assessment of the costs of 
productivity-enhancing investments in agricultural research, rural roads, and irrigation infrastructure and efficiency 
that can help farmers adapt to climate change. First, regardless of climate-change scenario, agriculture will be 
negatively affected by climate change. 
Climate change increases child malnutrition and reduces 
calorie consumption dramatically.  Thus, aggressive 
agricultural productivity investments are needed to 
raise calorie consumption enough to offset the negative 
impacts of climate-change on the health and well-being 
of children. 
In order to assess the costs of adaptation alone, 
it is important to identify agricultural productivity 
investments that reduce child malnutrition with 
climate change to no-climate-change levels, holding 
all other macro changes constant, such as income 
and population growth. Two scenarios are assessed.  
The first, shown in Table 7, focuses on developing 
countries and describes the investments needed to 
reduce childhood malnutrition close to level it would 
be without climatechange. The cost estimates are 
based only on productivity-enhancing investments in 
developing countries. The second experiment involves 
including additional productivity enhancements in 
developed countries to assess the potential for 
spillovers in the developing world. 
Table 8 reports the effects on daily per capita 
calorie availability for these two scenarios. Table 9 
reports the results for child malnutrition for the 
two climate models relative to the no–climate-
change scenario. Figures 6 and 7 are graphs of the 
malnutrition counts for the various developing-
country regions before and after the productivity-
enhancing investments. Finally, Table 10 reports the 
annualized additional investment costs needed to 
counteract the effects of climate change on children.
Table 7—Developing-country agricultural productivity investments
Source: Compiled by authors. 
60-percent increase in crop (all crops) yield growth over baseline
30-percent increase in animal numbers growth
40-percent increase in production growth of oils and meals
25-percent increase in irrigated area growth
15-percent decrease in rainfed area growth







































2000 2,424 2,879 3,017 2,879 2,846 2,316 2,696
2050
No climate change 2,660 3,277 3,382 2,985 3,119 2,452 2,886
NCAR 2,226 2,789 2,852 2,615 2,561 1,924 2,410
NCAR +  2,531 3,161 3,197 2,994 2,905 2,331 2,768
NCAR + +  2,564 3,198 3,235 3,027 2,941 2,367 2,803
CSIRO  2,255 2,814 2,885 2,628 2,596 1,931 2,432
CSIRO +  2,574 3,200 3,243 3,011 2,954 2,344 2,801
CSIRO ++  2,612 3,241 3,285 3,048 2,996 2,384 2,840
Source: Compiled by authors.
Note: NCAR + and CSIRO + include only agricultural productivity investments in the developing world. NCAR ++ and CSIRO 
++ include all productivity improvements in both developing and developed countries. The climate change results presented in 
this table assume no CO2 fertilization effects. 
























2000 75.62  23.81    4.11    7.69    3.46  32.67 147.84
2050
  No climate change 52.29  10.09   2.70  4.98 1.10 41.72 113.33
  NCAR 59.06 14.52   3.73 6.43 2.09 52.21 138.52
  NCAR +  54.16  10.82 3.04 4.94 1.37 44.09 118.87
  NCAR ++ 53.66 10.48 2.97 4.83 1.32 43.47 117.18
  CSIRO  58.56 14.25 3.66 6.37 2.01 52.06 137.39
  CSIRO + 53.51 10.44 2.95 4.88 1.29 43.87 117.40
  CSIRO ++  52.96 10.18 2.87 4.76 1.23 43.17 115.62
Source: Compiled by authors.
Note: NCAR + and CSIRO + include only agricultural productivity investments in the developing world. NCAR ++ and CSIRO 
++ include all productivity improvements in both developing and developed countries. The climate change results presented in 













































2000 No Climate Change NCAR
NCAR+ CSIRO CSIRO+
Source: Compiled by authors.
Figure 7—Child malnutrition effects, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin 




































2000 No Climate Change NCAR
NCAR+ CSIRO CSIRO+
Source: Compiled by authors.















Table 10—Additional annual investment expenditure needed to counteract the effects of climate 
change on nutrition (million 2000 US$)
Source: Compiled by authors.






















NCAR with developing-country investments
Agricultural research 172 151 84 426 169 314 1,316
Irrigation expansion 344 15 6 31 –26 537 907
Irrigation efficiency 999 686 99 129 59 187 2,158
Rural roads  
   (area expansion)
8 73 0 573 37 1,980 2,671
Rural roads  
   (yield increase)
9 9 10 3 1 35 66
Total 1,531 934 198 1,162 241 3,053 7,118
CSIRO with developing-country investments
Agricultural research 185 172 110 392 190 326 1,373
Irrigation expansion 344 1 1 30 –22 529 882
Irrigation efficiency 1,006 648 101 128 58 186 2,128
Rural Roads  
   (area expansion)
16 147 0 763 44 1,911 2,881
Rural Roads  
   (yield increase)
13 9 11 3 1 36 74
Total 1,565 977 222 1,315 271 2,987 7,338
As shown in Table 10, the additional annual 
investments needed to return the child malnutrition 
numbers to the no climate-change results are  
$7.1 billion under the wetter NCAR scenario and 
$7.3 billion under the drier CSIRO scenario. Sub-
Saharan African investment needs dominate, making up 
about 40 percent of the total. Of that amount, the vast 
majority is for rural roads. South Asia investments are 
about $1.5 billion per year, with Latin America and the 
Caribbean close behind with about $1.2 to $1.3 billion 
per year. East Asia and the Pacific needs are just under 
$1 billion per year.  Agricultural research is important in 
all three of these regions, as are irrigation investments. 
Unlike Sub-Saharan Africa, road investments in these 
regions are relatively small.
With additional investments in developed 
countries, spillover effects to the developing world 
reduce the need for adaptation investments slightly. 
For example, with the NCAR scenario, the annual 
investment need is $7.1 billion if productivity 
expenditures are only in the developing world. With 
developed-country productivity investments, that 
amount drops to $6.8 billion.
The key messages embodied in these results 
point to the importance of improving the productivity 
of agriculture as a means of meeting the future 
challenges that climate change represents. The path 
to the needed agricultural productivity gains varies by 
















his analysis brings together for the first time detailed modeling of crop growth under climate change with 
insights from an extremely detailed global agriculture model. The results show that agriculture and human 
well-being will be negatively affected by climate change. Crop yields will decline, production will be affected, 
crop and meat prices will increase, and consumption of cereals will fall, leading to reduced calorie intake and 
increased child malnutrition.
Conclusion
These stark results suggest the following policy and program recommendations: 
• Design and implement good overall development 
policies and programs. 
• Increase investments in agricultural productivity. 
• Reinvigorate national research and extension  
programs.  
• Improve global data collection, dissemination,  
and analysis. 
• Make agricultural adaptation a key agenda point 
within the international climate negotiation process. 
• Recognize that enhanced food security and climate-
change adaptation go hand in hand. 
• Support community-based adaptation strategies.
• Increase funding for adaptation programs by at least 
an additional $7 billion per year.
These investments may not guarantee that all the negative consequences of climate change can be overcome. 
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